A theoretical foundation of the Porter hypothesis

被引：323

作者：

Ambec, S

Barla, P

机构：

[1] Univ Grenoble, INRA SERD, F-38040 Grenoble 9, France

[2] Univ Salerno, CSEF, I-84100 Salerno, Italy

[3] Univ Laval, Cite Univ, Dept Econ, Laval, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

[4] Univ Laval, Cite Univ, GREEN, Laval, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2002年 / 75卷 / 03期

关键词：

renegotiation; regulation; R&D; Porter hypothesis;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00005-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This letter shows that, by reducing agency costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing innovation while at the same time increasing firms' private benefit. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：355 / 360

页数：6

共 6 条

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[2]

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PALMER, K ;

OATES, WE ;

PORTNEY, PR .

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[4] TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT-COMPETITIVENESS RELATIONSHIP [J].

PORTER, ME ;

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[5] AMERICA GREEN STRATEGY [J].

PORTER, ME .

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[6] LIMITED-LIABILITY CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT [J].

SAPPINGTON, D .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1983, 29 (01) :1-21

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