Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts

被引:579
作者
Cong, Lin William [1 ]
He, Zhiguo [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, 5807 S Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Booth Sch, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
TRANSPARENCY;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhz007
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Blockchain technology provides decentralized consensus and potentially enlarges the contracting space through smart contracts. Meanwhile, generating decentralized consensus entails distributing information that necessarily alters the informational environment. We analyze how decentralization relates to consensus quality and how the quintessential features of blockchain remold the landscape of competition. Smart contracts can mitigate informational asymmetry and improve welfare and consumer surplus through enhanced entry and competition, yet distributing information during consensus generation may encourage greater collusion. In general, blockchains sustain market equilibria with a wider range of economic outcomes. We further discuss the implications for antitrust policies targeted at blockchain applications. Received May 31, 2017; editorial decision May 29, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.
引用
收藏
页码:1754 / 1797
页数:44
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