Tournaments, fairness, and risk

被引：12

作者：

Wu, Steven ^{[1
]}

Roe, Brian ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Ohio State Univ, Dept Agr Environm & Dev Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

来源：

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 88卷 / 03期

关键词：

contract regulation; experiments; fairness; social preferences; tournaments;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-8276.2006.00879.x

中图分类号：

F3 [农业经济];

学科分类号：

0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;

摘要：

We estimate willingness to pay (WTP) to operate under two types of contracts-tournaments (Ts) and fixed performance-standard contracts (F). Our results are consistent with the notion that subjects having social preferences for fairness and care about risk. That is, when subjects experience greater inequity under tournaments relative to fixed performance contracts, or experience greater revenue risk under tournaments, the gap between WTP for fixed performance and tournament contracts increases, ceteris paribus. Our results provide an explanation for grower dissatisfaction with tournament compensation schemes independent of possible concerns regarding opportunistic behavior by integrators.

引用

页码：561 / 573

页数：13

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