Investor activism and takeovers

被引：227

作者：

Greenwood, Robin ^{[1
]}

Schor, Michael ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA

[2] Morgan Stanley, New York, NY 10036 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 92卷 / 03期

关键词：

Investor activism; Event studies; Hedge funds; Corporate control; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; FIRM PERFORMANCE; FUND ACTIVISM; RETURNS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.05.005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Recent work documents large positive abnormal returns when a hedge fund announces activist intentions regarding a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover. For a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for targets that are ultimately acquired, but not detectably different from zero for firms that remain independent. Firms targeted by activists are more likely than control firms to get acquired. Finally, activist investors' portfolios perform poorly during a period in which market wide takeover interest declined. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：362 / 375

页数：14

共 27 条

[1]

BAINBRIDGE S, 2005, SHAREHOLDER AC UNPUB

[2]

Bebchuk LA, 2007, VA LAW REV, V93, P675

[3]

BECHT M, 2008, REV FINANCI IN PRESS

[4]

Black B.S., 1998, NEW PALGRAVE DICT EC, V3, P459