Peer group micro-lending programs in Canada and the United States

被引:39
作者
Conlin, M [1 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, Dept Econ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
关键词
micro-lending; peer groups; Grameen Bank;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00043-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There are numerous theoretical models that consider peer group micro-lending programs. These models use monitoring, peer pressure, mutual insurance, information transfer and the costs of entering new relationships to explain the success of peer group micro-lending programs outside Canada and the United States (such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh). While these explanations may be applicable to programs abroad, they do not adequately describe the dynamics of many programs in Canada and the United States due to the vast difference in economic environment. I present a model that relies on screening and the reduction of overhead costs to explain the existence of peer group micro-lending programs in Canada and the United States. Evidence from these programs is presented to support the model. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:249 / 269
页数:21
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