Strong managers, weak owners: The political roots of American corporate finance - Roe,MJ

被引:3
作者
Adler, BE
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10.2307/1073707
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D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
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页码:1347 / 1368
页数:22
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