What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?

被引:50
作者
Heron, Randall A. [1 ]
Lie, Erik [2 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Indianapolis, IN 46202 USA
[2] Univ Iowa, Tippie Coll Business, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
关键词
executive compensation; stock option grants; backdating; AWARDS; DETERMINANTS; GOVERNANCE; EQUITY;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1080.0958
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We estimate that 13.6% of all option grants to top executives during the period 1996-2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated. Our study primarily focuses on grants that were unscheduled and at-the-money, of which we estimate that 18.9% were manipulated. The fraction is 23.0% before the new two-day. ling requirement took effect on August 29, 2002, and 10.0% afterward. For the minority of grants that are not filed within the required two-day window, the fraction of manipulated grants remains as high as 19.9%. We further find a higher frequency of manipulation among tech firms, small firms, and firms with high stock price volatility. In addition, firms that use smaller (non-big-five) auditing firms are more likely to. le their grants late. Finally, at the firm level, we estimate that 29.2% of firms manipulated grants to top executives at some point between 1996 and 2005.
引用
收藏
页码:513 / 525
页数:13
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