Organizational complexity and succession planning

被引:110
作者
Naveen, Lalitha [1 ]
机构
[1] Georgia State Univ, Dept Finance, J Mack Robinson Sch Business, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1017/S002210900000257X
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study uses a large sample of firms to examine how human capital considerations affect the process of CEO succession. Costs and benefits of succession planning are affected by a firm's level of operational complexity and human capital requirements; firms that are more complex incur greater costs to transferring firm-specific knowledge and expertise to an outsider, and should be more likely to groom an internal candidate for the CEO position. Consistent with this, I find that a firm's propensity to groom an internal candidate for the CEO position is related to firm size, degree of diversification, and industry structure. My results also suggest that succession planning is associated with a higher probability of inside succession and voluntary succession and a lower probability of forced succession. I also provide evidence that horizon problems are mitigated to some extent by having a succession plan.
引用
收藏
页码:661 / 683
页数:23
相关论文
共 42 条
[1]  
AGRAWAL A, 2006, IN PRESS J CORPORATE
[2]  
Baliga BR, 1996, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V17, P41, DOI 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199601)17:1<41::AID-SMJ784>3.0.CO
[3]  
2-#
[4]  
Becker G.S., 1965, HUMAN CAPITAL
[5]   CORPORATE RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS - INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS [J].
BHAGAT, S ;
WELCH, I .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1995, 19 (2-3) :443-470
[6]   AN ANALYSIS OF STOCK-PRICE REACTION TO MANAGEMENT CHANGE IN DISTRESSED FIRMS [J].
BONNIER, KA ;
BRUNER, RF .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1989, 11 (01) :95-106
[7]   Outside directors and CEO selection [J].
Borokhovich, KA ;
Parrino, R ;
Trapani, T .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1996, 31 (03) :337-355
[8]  
Brickley J.A., 1997, J CORP FINANC, V3, P189, DOI [10.1016/S0929-1199(96)00013-2, DOI 10.1016/S0929-1199(96)00013-2, 10.1016/s0929-1199(96)00013-2]
[9]   What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives [J].
Brickley, JA ;
Linck, JS ;
Coles, JL .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1999, 52 (03) :341-377
[10]  
CANNELLA AA, 1993, ACAD MANAGE J, V36, P763, DOI 10.5465/256758