Joint production in teams

被引：20

作者：

Battaglini, Marco ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2006年 / 130卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

contract theory; incentives; moral hazard; teams; theory of the firm;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Consider Holmstrom's moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has an a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output is in-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation generically exists if and only if Sigma(n)(i=1)a(i)/(n - 1) < m. Moreover, under a weak additional condition, the equilibrium implemented by this mechanism is unique in the class of pure strategy Coalition-Proof equilibria. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：138 / 167

页数：30

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