Duration of Executive Compensation

被引：194

作者：

Gopalan, Radhakrishnan ^{[1
]}

Milbourn, Todd ^{[1
]}

Song, Fenghua ^{[2
]}

Thakor, Anjan V. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Washington Univ, Olin Business Sch, St Louis, MO 63130 USA

[2] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2014年 / 69卷 / 06期

关键词：

RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INCENTIVE COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; CEO INCENTIVES; LONG-TERM; STOCK; RISK; PAY;

D O I：

10.1111/jofi.12085

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of short-termism in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short-termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short-term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long-term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings-increasing accruals.

引用

页码：2777 / 2817

页数：41

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