Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies

被引:19
作者
Ichiishi, T [1 ]
Idzik, A [1 ]
机构
[1] POLISH ACAD SCI,INST COMP SCI,PL-01237 WARSAW,POLAND
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF01803951
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper provides a formal framework within which to study cooperative behavior in the presence of incomplete information, and shows how far the known results in the static cooperative game theory can readily be applied to the proposed framework. The new concepts of Bayesian society, Bayesian strong equilibrium and Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium are introduced and studied.
引用
收藏
页码:455 / 473
页数:19
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