The Returns to Office in a "Rubber Stamp" Parliament

被引:161
作者
Truex, Rory [1 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Polit Sci, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
AUTHORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS;
D O I
10.1017/S0003055414000112
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Are there returns to office in an authoritarian parliament? A new dataset shows that over 500 deputies to China's National People's Congress are CEOs of various companies. Entropy balancing is used to construct a weighted portfolio of Chinese companies that matches companies with NPC representation on relevant financial characteristics prior to the 11th Congress (2008-2012). The weighted fixed effect analysis suggests that a seat in the NPC is worth an additional 1.5 percentage points in returns and a 3 to 4 percentage point boost in operating profit margin in a given year. Additional evidence reveals that these rents stem primarily from the "reputation boost" of the position, and not necessarily formal policy influence. These findings confirm the assumptions of several prominent theories of authoritarian politics but suggest the need to further probe the nature of these institutions.
引用
收藏
页码:235 / 251
页数:17
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