Tax incidence with bargaining

被引:4
作者
Chae, S [1 ]
机构
[1] Rice Univ, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77005 USA
关键词
tax incidence; bargaining; nash bargaining solution; bargaining power;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00138-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper investigates tax incidence in a two-person bargaining model where one party is taxed. The condition under which the non-taxed party shares the burden of taxes (or benefit of subsidies) is characterized. Sufficient conditions for the tax burden to fall entirely on the taxed party are given. Also, a sufficient condition for the non-taxed party actually to benefit from taxation is given. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:199 / 204
页数:6
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