The economics of roscas and intrahousehold resource allocation

被引:220
作者
Anderson, S [1 ]
Baland, JM [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Namur, Dept Econ, CRED, Namur, Belgium
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003355302760193931
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. We propose an explanation of this based on conflictual interactions within the household. Participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.
引用
收藏
页码:963 / 995
页数:33
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