An empirical test of the asymmetric models on innovative activity: who invests more into R&D, the incumbent or the challenger?

被引：52

作者：

Czarnitzki, D

Kraft, K

机构：

[1] Ctr European Econ Res, Dept Ind Econ & Int Management, D-68161 Mannheim, Germany

[2] Univ Dortmund, Fac Econ, Dortmund, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2004年 / 54卷 / 02期

关键词：

innovative activity; patent races; uncertainty; incumbent versus entrant; Tobit with selectivity;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.008

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study whether the incumbent or the (potential) entrant invests more into R&D, using data of about 3500 German firms from 1992 to 1995 that explicitly asks firms for their motives in undertaking innovative activity, making it possible to take account intended, not just completed, market entry. We find that challengers invest more into R&D to enter a new market than the incumbents, making the patent racing model by Reinganum and others seem more accurate than the auction model of Gilbert and Newbery. We estimate a tobit model with selectivity to take account of the econometric problem of double censoring. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：153 / 173

页数：21

共 43 条

[1]

Acs Z., 1990, INNOVATION SMALL FIR

[2]

ACS ZJ, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P678

[3] A MODEL OF GROWTH THROUGH CREATIVE DESTRUCTION [J].