Endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection: A long-run model of trade policy determination

被引:142
作者
Mitra, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Florida Int Univ, Dept Econ, Miami, FL 33199 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.89.5.1116
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions. Under certain conditions, free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare. Moreover, greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and, in most cases, more protection for each of these lobbies. Furthermore, industries with higher levels of capital stock, fewer capitalists, more inelastic demand, and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized. (JEL F10, F13).
引用
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页码:1116 / 1134
页数:19
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