Explaining executive compensation: Managerial power versus the perceived cost of stock options

被引:154
作者
Murphy, KJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ So Calif, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
[2] Univ So Calif, Sch Law, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1600633
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:847 / 869
页数:23
相关论文
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