Different firm size effects on wages for supervisors and workers

被引：12

作者：

Meagher, KJ ^{[1
]}

Wilson, H ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ New S Wales, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2004年 / 84卷 / 02期

关键词：

firm size; supervision; hierarchy; earnings; plant size;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2004.02.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We find that: (i) the plant size effect for supervisors is at least double that of non-supervisors, (ii) the difference is statistically significant and (iii) the firm size effect for supervisors is not explained by differential returns on standard variables. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：225 / 230

页数：6

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