Firm diversification and CEO compensation: managerial ability or executive entrenchment?

被引：132

作者：

Rose, NL

Shepard, A

机构：

[1] NBER,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

[2] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1997年 / 28卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2556026

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Investigating the relationship between CEO compensation and firm diversification over 1985-1990, we find that the CEO of a Jinn with two lines of business averages 13% more in salary and bonus than the CEO of a similar-sized but undiversified firm, cateris paribus. We explore two potential explanations for this: the march of higher-ability CEOs with firms that are more difficult to manage, and the association of diversification with CEO entrenchment. The data are more consistent with ability matching: the premium is invariant to CEO tenure, and incumbents who diversify their firms earn less than newly hired CEOs at already-diversified firms.

引用

页码：489 / 514

页数：26

共 31 条

[1] RISK REDUCTION AS A MANAGERIAL MOTIVE FOR CONGLOMERATE MERGERS [J].