CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE INCENTIVE TO BECOME INFORMED

被引：43

作者：

Armstrong, Mark ^{[1
]}

Vickers, John ^{[2
]}

Zhou, Jidong ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UCL, London WC1E 6BT, England

[2] Univ Oxford All Souls Coll, Oxford OX1 4AL, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION | 2009年 / 7卷 / 2-3期

基金：

英国经济与社会研究理事会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.399

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We discuss the impact of consumer protection policies on consumers' incentives to become informed of the best deals available in the market. In a market with costly information acquisition, we find that imposing a cap on suppliers' prices reduces the incentive to become informed of market conditions, with the result that prices paid by consumers (both informed and uninformed) may rise. In a related model where consumers have the ability to refuse to receive marketing, we find that this ability softens price competition and can make all consumers worse off. (JEL: D18, D83, L51)

引用

页码：399 / 410

页数：12

共 5 条

[1]

ANDERSON S, 2008, INFORM CONGESTION OP

[2]

Armstrong M, 2008, COMPET POLICY INT, V4, P97

[3] EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISPERSION [J].