National champions and corruption: Some unpleasant interventionist arithmetic

被引：172

作者：

Ades, A ^{[1
]}

DiTella, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV OXFORD KEBLE COLL, OXFORD OX1 3PG, ENGLAND

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 1997年 / 107卷 / 443期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1468-0297.00204

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We present a hold-up model of investment where active industrial policy promotes both corruption and investment. Since corruption deters investment, the effect of industrial policy on investment is lower than when corruption is absent. We find evidence suggesting that corruption is indeed higher in countries pursuing active industrial policies. Policy implications are illustrated by decomposing the total effect of industrial policy into a positive, direct effect, and a negative, corruption-induced effect. In the presence of corruption, the total effect of industrial policy on investment ranges between 84 and 56% of the direct impact. The magnitude of these corrections suggests that corruption considerations should not be absent from cost-benefit analyses of industrial policies.

引用

页码：1023 / 1042

页数：20

共 31 条

[1]

ADES A, 1994, UNPUB COMPETITION CO

[2]

[Anonymous], 1991, International Economics

[3]

BALDWIN R, 1987, TRADE POLICY EMPIRIC

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