Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly

被引:24
作者
Einy, E [1 ]
Moreno, D
Shitovitz, B
机构
[1] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ, E-28903 Getafe, Spain
[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
[3] Univ Haifa, Dept Econ, IL-31905 Haifa, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
oligopoly; information advantage; Cournot competitition;
D O I
10.1006/jeth.2001.2871
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Consider an oligopolistic industry where firms have access to the same technology but are asymmetrically informed about the environment. Even though it is commonplace to think that in this context superior information leads to higher profits, we find that under Cournot competition this is not generally the case: It holds when firms' technology exhibits constant returns to scale, but it does not necessarily hold otherwise. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
引用
收藏
页码:151 / 160
页数:10
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