Optimal bankruptcy law and firm-specific investments

被引：25

作者：

Berkovitch, E

Israel, R

Zender, JF

机构：

[1] UNIV MICHIGAN,ANN ARBOR,MI 48109

[2] UNIV UTAH,SALT LAKE CITY,UT 84112

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1997年 / 41卷 / 3-5期

关键词：

bankruptcy law; firm-specific investment; restricted auction mechanism;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00016-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In Mis paper we characterize an optimal bankruptcy law that takes into consideration the incentives of managers to invest in firm-specific human capital. We show that the optimal bankruptcy law is biased towards the management team, and may be implemented by the use of a 'restricted auction' mechanism, in which creditors have the right to refuse bankruptcy, but are not allowed to bid for the firm. The bankruptcy law is needed as a commitment device to implement the optimal outcome.

引用

页码：487 / 497

页数：11