Entrepreneurial Finance and Nondiversifiable Risk

被引:92
作者
Chen, Hui [1 ]
Miao, Jianjun [2 ,3 ]
Wang, Neng [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] MIT Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] Boston Univ, CEMA, Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA
[3] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[4] Columbia Univ, NBER, New York, NY 10027 USA
[5] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
关键词
G11; G31; E20; DYNAMIC CAPITAL STRUCTURE; PERMANENT-INCOME HYPOTHESIS; MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS; INCOMPLETE MARKETS; CORPORATE-DEBT; PRIVATE EQUITY; INVESTMENT; AGENCY; CONSUMPTION; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhq122
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We develop a dynamic incomplete-markets model of entrepreneurial firms, and demonstrate the implications of nondiversifiable risks for entrepreneurs' interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business exit decisions. We characterize the optimal capital structure via a generalized tradeoff model where risky debt provides significant diversification benefits. Nondiversifiable risks have several important implications: More risk-averse entrepreneurs default earlier, but choose higher leverage; lack of diversification causes entrepreneurial firms to underinvest relative to public firms, and risky debt partially alleviates this problem; and entrepreneurial risk aversion can overturn the risk-shifting incentives induced by risky debt. We also analytically characterize the idiosyncratic risk premium.
引用
收藏
页码:4348 / 4388
页数:41
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