Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries

被引:582
作者
Friedman, E
Johnson, S
Kaufmann, D
Zoido-Lobaton, P
机构
[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] Rutgers State Univ, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 USA
[3] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA
关键词
corruption; over-regulation; taxation; legal system; unofficial economy;
D O I
10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00093-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Across 69 countries, higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity. Entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. Dodging the 'grabbing hand' in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total GDP. As a result, corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A, All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:459 / 493
页数:35
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