Are Democracies the Better Allies? The Impact of Regime Type on Military Coalition Operations

被引:23
作者
Pilster, Ulrich [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Essex, Dept Govt, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England
关键词
civil-military relations; military coalitions; military effectiveness; military interventions; regime type; POWERFUL STATES; WAR; INTERVENTION; MULTILATERALISM; CONSEQUENCES; ALLIANCES; CONFLICT; DURATION; OUTCOMES;
D O I
10.1080/03050629.2011.546259
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
This study asks which attributes make states the more valuable partners in military coalition operations. Due to the uncertainty inherent in combat in general and coalition operations in particular, successful military cooperation depends on the amount of discretion given to national armed forces. Since democracies usually have more harmonious civil-military relations, restricting the discretion of military agents is a relatively less attractive and needed tool for democratic principals. This in turn makes democratic states the more valuable allies. The argument has two empirical implications: On one hand, a state conducting a military intervention should be more likely to build a coalition with its allies, the more democratic allies it has. On the other hand, military interventions by democratic military coalitions should end more quickly with success for the interveners than interventions by nondemocratic coalitions. These hypotheses are tested and supported using data on military interventions between 1946 and 2001.
引用
收藏
页码:55 / 85
页数:31
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