The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature

被引:1254
作者
Beyer, Anne [2 ]
Cohen, Daniel A. [3 ]
Lys, Thomas Z. [1 ]
Walther, Beverly R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[3] Univ Texas Dallas, Richardson, TX 75080 USA
关键词
Information environment; Voluntary disclosures; Mandatory disclosures; Regulation; Analysts; REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE; ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECASTS; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT; PRO FORMA EARNINGS; STOCK OPTION AWARDS; MARKING-TO-MARKET; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; INFORMATION-CONTENT; CONFERENCE CALLS; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The corporate information environment develops endogenously as a consequence of information asymmetries and agency problems between investors, entrepreneurs, and managers. We review current research on the three main decisions that shape the corporate information environment in capital market settings: (1) managers' voluntary disclosure decisions, (2) disclosures mandated by regulators, and (3) reporting decisions by analysts. We conclude that, in the last ten years, research has generated several useful insights. Despite this progress, we call for researchers to consider interdependencies between the various decisions that shape the corporate information environment and suggest new and interesting issues for researchers to address. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:296 / 343
页数:48
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