Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: The impact of earnings management

被引：363

作者：

Cornett, Marcia Millon ^{[2
]}

Marcus, Alan J. ^{[1
]}

Tehranian, Hassan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Boston Coll, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA

[2] So Illinois Univ, Carbondale, IL 62901 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2008年 / 87卷 / 02期

关键词：

corporate governance; earnings management; financial performance; stock options;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We ask whether the apparent impact of governance structure and incentive-based compensation on firm performance stands up when measured performance is adjusted for the effects of earnings management. Institutional ownership of shares, institutional investor representation on the board of directors, and the presence of independent outside directors on the board all reduce the use of discretionary accruals. These factors largely offset the impact of option compensation, which strongly encourages earnings management. Adjusting for the impact of earnings management substantially increases the measured importance of governance variables and dramatically decreases the impact of incentive-based compensation on corporate performance. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：357 / 373

页数：17

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