Institutional development, state ownership, and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China

被引:99
作者
Kusnadi, Yuanto [1 ]
Yang, Zhifeng [2 ]
Zhou, Yuxiao [3 ]
机构
[1] Singapore Management Univ, Sch Accountancy, Singapore 178902, Singapore
[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Coll Business, Dept Accountancy, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Coll Business, Guangzhou 510275, Guangdong, Peoples R China
关键词
Institutional development; State ownership; Political connections; Cash holdings; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; GOVERNANCE; FINANCE; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.06.023
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines how institutional develppment and state ownership influence corporate cash holdings among Chinese firms. The empirical results reveal that firms in provinces with more developed institutions (non-state-controlled firms) hold more (less) cash reserves than those in provinces with less developed institutions (state-controlled firms). Moreover, the positive effect between institutional development and cash holdings is more prominent for non-state-controlled firms. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that more developed institutions mitigate the threat of political extraction for non-state-controlled firms, resulting in larger cash holdings among these firms. Subsequent analyses demonstrate that the impact of institutional development on cash holdings is weakened for non-state-controlled firms which have established political connections. Therefore, this study identifies one vital channel through which political connections are beneficial for non-state-controlled firms in terms of mitigating the threat of political extraction. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:351 / 359
页数:9
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