Sometimes it just feels right: The differential weighting of affect-consistent and affect-inconsistent product information

被引:181
作者
Adaval, R [1 ]
机构
[1] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
D O I
10.1086/321944
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
An affect-confirmation process is proposed to explain the conditions in which information that is similar in valence (i.e., evaluatively consistent) with a person's mood is weighted more heavily in product judgments. Specifically, the affect that participants experience as a result of a transitory mood state may appear to either confirm or disconfirm their reactions to product information, leading them to give this information more or less weight when evaluating the product as a whole. This affective confirmation typically occurs when hedonic criteria are considered more important in evaluation than utilitarian criteria. Four experiments confirmed implications of this conceptualization.
引用
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页码:1 / 17
页数:17
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