Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

被引：111

作者：

Fuchs, William ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Chicago, Dept Econ, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2007年 / 97卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.97.4.1432

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：1432 / 1448

页数：17

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