A theory of privatisation

被引:647
作者
Boycko, M
Shleifer, A
Vishny, RW
机构
[1] HARVARD UNIV, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 USA
[2] UNIV CHICAGO, CHICAGO, IL 60637 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2235248
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient, primarily because they pursue strategies, such as excess employment, that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them. Privatisation of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them, since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms. In this way, privatisation leads to efficient restructuring of firms. Moreover, privatisation is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy, and when the new owners of firms are profit maximising investors, rather than their employees or even managers.
引用
收藏
页码:309 / 319
页数:11
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1990, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1992, PRIVATIZATION LESSON
[3]  
BOYCKO M, 1993, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC, P139
[4]   THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST [J].
COASE, RH .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1960, 3 (OCT) :1-44
[5]  
DESILANES FL, 1994, UNPUB DETERMINANTS P
[6]  
DEWATRIPONT M, 1990, UNPUB CREDIT EFFICIE
[7]  
DONAHUE JD, 1989, PRIVATIZATION PROCES
[8]  
FRYDMAN R, 1991, REFORMING CENTRAL E
[9]   THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OWNERSHIP - A THEORY OF VERTICAL AND LATERAL INTEGRATION [J].
GROSSMAN, SJ ;
HART, OD .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1986, 94 (04) :691-719
[10]   WHEN DOES WORKER OWNERSHIP WORK - ESOPS, LAW FIRMS, CODETERMINATION, AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY [J].
HANSMANN, H .
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1990, 99 (08) :1749-1816