Investor Competition over Information and the Pricing of Information Asymmetry

被引：105

作者：

Akins, Brian K. ^{[1
]}

Jeffrey Ng ^{[1
]}

Verdi, Rodrigo S. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2012年 / 87卷 / 01期

关键词：

information risk; information quality; asset pricing; EARNINGS-ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT; ACCRUAL ESTIMATION ERRORS; LONG-LIVED INFORMATION; BID ASK SPREAD; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; STOCK-PRICES; FUTURE EARNINGS; IMPERFECT COMPETITION; INFORMED TRADERS; FULLY REFLECT;

D O I：

10.2308/accr-10157

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Whether the information environment affects the cost of capital is a fundamental question in accounting and finance research. Relying on theories about competition between informed investors as well as the pricing of information asymmetry, we hypothesize a cross-sectional variation in the pricing of information asymmetry that is conditional on competition. We develop and validate empirical proxies for competition using the number and concentration of institutional investor ownership. Using these proxies, we find a lower pricing of information asymmetry when there is more competition. Overall, our results suggest that competition between informed investors has an important effect on how the information environment affects the cost of capital.

引用

页码：35 / 58

页数：24

共 58 条

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