Communication, computability, and common interest games

被引：13

作者：

Anderlini, L ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Cambridge St Johns Coll, Cambridge CB2 1TP, England

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1999年 / 27卷 / 01期

关键词：

common interest games; computability; preplay communication;

D O I：

10.1006/game.1998.0652

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper provides a theory of equilibrium selection for one-shot, two-player, finite-action, strategic-form Common Interest games. A single round of costless unlimited preplay communication is allowed. Players are restricted to using strategies that are computable in the sense of Church's Thesis. The equilibrium notion used involves perturbations that are themselves computable. The only equilibrium payoff vector that survives these strategic restrictions and the computable perturbations is the unique Pareto-efficient one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C79. (C) 1999 Academic Press.

引用

页码：1 / 37

页数：37

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