Corruption, inequality, and fairness

被引：122

作者：

Alesina, A

Angeletos, GM

机构：

[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[2] Harvard Univ, Sch Med, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 52卷 / 07期

关键词：

corruption; rent seeking; inequality; fairness; redistribution; political economy;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.05.003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1227 / 1244

页数：18

共 29 条

[1]

Alesina A, 2001, IMF STAFF PAPERS, V48, P447

[2] Fairness and redistribution [J].