Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions:: An experimental study

被引：35

作者：

Güth, W

Ivanova-Stenzel, R

Wolfstetter, E

机构：

[1] Humboldt Univ, Dept Econ, D-10099 Berlin, Germany

[2] Max Planck Inst Res Econ Syst, D-07745 Jena, Germany

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2005年 / 49卷 / 07期

关键词：

sealed bid auctions; asymmetric bidders; private-independent values; experiments;

D O I：

10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.09.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (Int. J. Game Theory 20 (1992) 393) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which first-order stochastically dominates the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong, and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1891 / 1913

页数：23

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