Professional advice

被引：100

作者：

Ottaviani, M

Sorensen, PN

机构：

[1] London Business Sch, Econ Subject Area, London NW1 4SA, England

[2] Univ Copenhagen, Inst Econ, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2006年 / 126卷 / 01期

关键词：

reputation; cheap talks; advice; herding;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly tractable (multiplicative linear) structure. The quality of the expert's information is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. In equilibrium of this reputational cheap-talk game, no more than two messages are effectively reported. The model is extended to consider sequential communication by experts with conditionally independent signals. In the long run, learning is incomplete and herd behavior arises. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：120 / 142

页数：23

共 37 条

[1] Broadcasting opinions with an overconfident sender [J].