Political connections and the cost of equity capital

被引:532
作者
Boubakri, Narjess [1 ]
Guedhami, Omrane [2 ]
Mishra, Dev [3 ]
Saffar, Walid [4 ]
机构
[1] Amer Univ Sharjah, Sharjah, U Arab Emirates
[2] Univ S Carolina, Moore Sch Business, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
[3] Univ Saskatchewan, Edwards Sch Business, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A7, Canada
[4] Amer Univ Beirut, Olayan Sch Business, Beirut 11072020, Lebanon
关键词
Political connections; Corporate governance; Cost of capital; IMPLIED COST; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CROSS-SECTION; STOCK; DISCLOSURE; FIRMS; RETURN; RISK; INFORMATION; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.02.005
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. We find further that political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political connection on firms' equity financing costs is influenced by the prevailing country-level institutional and political environment, and by firm characteristics. Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggests that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:541 / 559
页数:19
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