Determinants of corporate ownership and board structure: evidence from Singapore

被引:197
作者
Mak, YT [1 ]
Li, Y [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Fac Business Adm, Dept Finance & Accounting, Singapore 117591, Singapore
关键词
corporate governance; board of directors; corporate ownership; simultaneous equations;
D O I
10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00021-9
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the determinants and interrelationships among corporate ownership and board structure characteristics using a sample of Singapore listed firms. The institutional environment in Singapore differs from that in many developed Western economies in several important respects, including a weak market for corporate control, more concentrated stock ownership, and significant government ownership in many private sector firms. Three characteristics-board composition, board leadership structure and board size-are used to capture the monitoring ability of the board. These board characteristics are assumed to be endogenously determined, together with two ownership characteristics, managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. We use two-stage least squares regression to estimate the determinants of board and ownership characteristics. Our findings indicate that corporate ownership and board structures are related, and that there are significant interrelationships among board structure characteristics. The proportion of outside directors is negatively related to managerial ownership, board size and government ownership. The use of a dual leadership structure is positively related to blockholder ownership, and negatively related to regulation and to CEO tenure. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:235 / 256
页数:22
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