The division of spoils: Rent-sharing and discrimination in a regulated industry

被引:160
作者
Black, SE
Strahan, PE
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[2] Boston Coll, Dept Finance, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.91.4.814
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Until the middle of the 1970's, regulations constrained banks' ability to enter new markets. Over the subsequent 25 years, states gradually lifted these restrictions. This paper tests whether rents fostered by regulation were shared with labor, and whether firms were discriminating by sharing these rents disproportionately with male workers. We find that average compensation and average wages for banking employees fell after states deregulated. Male wages fell by about 12 percent after deregulation, whereas women's wages fell by only 3 percent, suggesting that rents were shared mainly with men. Women's share of employment in managerial positions also increased following deregulation.
引用
收藏
页码:814 / 831
页数:18
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