The shareholder wealth maximization norm and industrial organization

Industrial organization affects the relative effectiveness of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in maximizing total social wealth. In nations where product markets are not strongly competitive, a strong shareholder primacy norm fits less comfortably with national wealth maximization than elsewhere because, where competition is weak, shareholder primacy induces managers to cut production and raise price more than they otherwise would. Mere competition is fierce, managers do not have that option. There is a rough congruence between this inequality of fit and the varying strengths of shareholder primacy norms around the world. In continental Europe, for example, shareholder primacy norms have been weaker than in the United States. Because Europe's fragmented national product markets were historically less competitive than those in the United States, their greater skepticism of the norm's value came closer to fitting the structure of their product markets than did any similar skepticism here. As Europe's markets integrate, making its product markets more competitive, pressure has arisen to strengthen shareholder norms and institutions.