Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution

被引：155

作者：

Jorgensen, Steffen ^{[2
]}

Martin-Herran, Guiomar ^{[3
]}

Zaccour, Georges ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HEC Montreal, Gerad, Chair Game Theory & Management, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[2] Univ So Denmark, Dept Econ & Business, Odense, Denmark

[3] Univ Valladolid, Dept Econ Aplicada Matemat, Valladolid, Spain

来源：

ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING & ASSESSMENT | 2010年 / 15卷 / 06期

关键词：

Environment; Economics; Pollution; State-space dynamic games; Cooperative and noncooperative games; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; INCENTIVE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES; ACID-RAIN GAME; DIFFERENTIAL GAME; CLIMATE-CHANGE; TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION; NASH EQUILIBRIA; CARBON TAXES; LEVIATHAN GOVERNMENTS; NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH;

D O I：

10.1007/s10666-010-9221-7

中图分类号：

X [环境科学、安全科学];

学科分类号：

08 ; 0830 ;

摘要：

The paper provides a survey of the literature which utilizes dynamic state-space games to formulate and analyze intertemporal, many decision-maker problems in the economics and management of pollution.

引用

页码：433 / 467

页数：35

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