An economic theory of GATT

被引:447
作者
Bagwell, K
Staiger, RW
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.89.1.215
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
propose a unified theoretical framework within which to interpret and evaluate the foundational principles of GATT. Working within a general equilibrium trade model, we represent government preferences in a way that is consistent with national income maximization but also allows for the possibility of distributional concerns as emphasized in leading political-economy models. Using this general framework, we establish that GATT's principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be viewed as simple rules that assist governments in their effort to implement efficient trade agreements. From this perspective, we argue that preferential agreements undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes. (JEL F02, F13, F15).
引用
收藏
页码:215 / 248
页数:34
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