Innovation and imitation under imperfect patent protection

被引：23

作者：

Takalo, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Helsinki, Dept Econ, FIN-00014 Helsinki, Finland

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 67卷 / 03期

关键词：

patent policy; secrecy; spillovers;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01234644

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper develops a model in which the spillover of R&D is a consequence of a rational investment in imitation. The model incorporates the innovator's choice between patenting and secrecy as a protection device. The analysis demonstrates that an increase in patent breadth always discourages resorting to secrecy, whereas the influence of increased patent life is the opposite with large spillovers. An increase in patent life can also reduce innovative activity with large spillovers. Under endogenous imitation, short patents are socially optimal.

引用

页码：229 / 241

页数：13

共 15 条

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[Anonymous], 1969, INVENTION GROWTH WEL

[2]

CADOT O, 1995, 23 INSEAD I EUR ADM

[3] Patent races and optimal patent breadth and length [J].