Does the PCAOB international inspection program improve audit quality for non-US-listed foreign clients?

被引:94
作者
Fung, Simon Yu Kit [1 ]
Raman, K. K. [2 ]
Zhu, Xindong [3 ]
机构
[1] Deakin Univ, Geelong, Vic, Australia
[2] Univ Texas San Antonio, San Antonio, TX USA
[3] City Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
PCAOB international inspection program; Foreign auditors; Non-US-listed foreign public companies; Audit quality; Positive externality; INITIATED CLAWBACK PROVISIONS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; PRODUCT QUALITY; INVESTOR PROTECTION; NONAUDIT SERVICES; FIRMS; FEES; REPUTATION; ACCRUALS; INDEPENDENCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.04.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program improves audit quality for a sample of non-US-listed foreign public client companies from 55 countries audited by foreign (i.e., non-US) auditors. For a sample of non-US-listed clients of PCAOB-registered foreign auditors, we find that initial PCAOB inspections improve audit quality, over and above the threat of such inspections, for foreign auditors' non-US-listed foreign clients. Our findings document the benefits of PCAOB international inspections for foreign investors in non-US-listed foreign companies which could increase the acceptability of the PCAOB international inspection program abroad. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:15 / 36
页数:22
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