A Competing Risks Analysis of Corporate Survival

被引：22

作者：

He, Qing ^{[1
]}

Chong, Terence Tai-Leung ^{[2
]}

Li, Li ^{[3
]}

Zhang, Jun ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Renmin Univ China, China Financial Policy Res Ctr, Sch Finance, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China

[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[3] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[4] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2010年 / 39卷 / 04期

关键词：

FREE CASH FLOW; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; OPERATING PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS; TAKEOVER TARGETS; STOCK-MARKET; DETERMINANTS; DISTRESS; TRANSACTIONS; DECISION;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1755-053X.2010.01127.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates how the characteristics of a Hong Kong-listed firm influence its odds of going bankrupt, being acquired, and going private. A competing risks model is estimated. Our results reveal that larger firms are more vulnerable to bankruptcy, and that fast-growing firms are more likely to be acquired. We also demonstrate that undervaluation is a key driver of going private. Despite the low agency cost due to the concentrated ownership structure, the propensity of Hong Kong-listed firms to go private still increases with the level of free cash flow.

引用

页码：1697 / 1718

页数：22

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