A differential game model of tariff war

被引：7

作者：

Kemp, MC

Van Long, N

Shimomura, K

机构：

[1] Kobe Univ, Res Inst Econ & Business Adm, Nada Ku, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan

[2] McGill Univ, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[3] Univ New S Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia

来源：

JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY | 2001年 / 13卷 / 03期

关键词：

tariff-setting game; durable consumption good; Markov-perfect strategies; the rate of time preference;

D O I：

10.1016/S0922-1425(01)00051-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We present a simple two(-country) by two(-good) differential game model of international trade in which the governments of the two countries play a tariff-setting game. We explicitly derive a unilateral optimum tariff rate and then a Markov-perfect equilibrium pair of tariff strategies (bilateral optimum tariff strategies) and compare the welfare level of each country among autarchic, free-trade, unilateral and bilateral optimum-tariff equilibria. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：279 / 298

页数：20