Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance

被引:293
作者
Connelly, Brian L. [1 ]
Hoskisson, Robert E.
Tihanyi, Laszlo
Certo, S. Trevis
机构
[1] Auburn Univ, Auburn, AL 36849 USA
关键词
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; FIRM PERFORMANCE; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP; VENTURE CAPITALIST; LEVERAGED BUYOUTS; BOARD COMPOSITION; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; AGENCY PROBLEMS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00929.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
P>Firm ownership is an increasingly influential form of corporate governance. Although firms might be owned by different types of owners, most studies examine owner influence on a particular firm outcome in isolation. This study synthesizes research from multiple disciplines on different types of owners and offers a unifying framework of governance through ownership. Using this framework, we describe the motivations of various types of owners, the tactics owners use to affect firms in which they are invested, and the dominant firm outcomes these owners seek to influence. We note how heightened managerial awareness of heterogeneous owner interests increases owner influence on firm-level outcomes. We also provide a roadmap for future study and offer research questions about where scholars might turn their attention to better understand the role of owners in directing firm actions. Our study draws attention to emerging forms of ownership, such as hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds, and highlights the changing (and often competing) interests of shareholders and how this impacts theories of governance.
引用
收藏
页码:1561 / 1589
页数:29
相关论文
共 164 条
[1]  
ADMATI AR, 2007, WALL STREET WALK SHA
[2]   Portfolio preferences of foreign institutional investors [J].
Aggarwal, R ;
Klapper, L ;
Wysocki, PD .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2005, 29 (12) :2919-2946
[3]   AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS APPROACH TO FINANCIAL CONTRACTING [J].
AGHION, P ;
BOLTON, P .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1992, 59 (03) :473-494
[4]   Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders [J].
Agrawal, A ;
Knoeber, CR .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1996, 31 (03) :377-397
[5]   Active institutional shareholders and costs of monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation [J].
Almazan, A ;
Hartzell, JC ;
Starks, LT .
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 2005, 34 (04) :5-34
[6]   RISK REDUCTION AS A MANAGERIAL MOTIVE FOR CONGLOMERATE MERGERS [J].
AMIHUD, Y ;
LEV, B .
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1981, 12 (02) :605-617
[7]   Ownership, exit and voice after mass privatization - Evidence from Mongolia [J].
Anderson, JH ;
Korsun, G ;
Murrell, P .
ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, 1999, 7 (01) :215-243
[8]   Ownership studies: The data source does matter [J].
Anderson, RC ;
Lee, DS .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1997, 32 (03) :311-329
[9]   Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 [J].
Anderson, RC ;
Reeb, DM .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (03) :1301-1328
[10]  
[Anonymous], 2420 WORLD BANK