Takeovers and Divergence of Investor Opinion

被引：57

作者：

Chatterjee, Sris ^{[2
]}

John, Kose ^{[1
]}

Yan, An ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA

[2] Fordham Univ, Bronx, NY 10458 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2012年 / 25卷 / 01期

关键词：

G14; G32; G34; SHORT-SALE CONSTRAINTS; CROSS-SECTION; STOCK RETURNS; SPECULATIVE BUBBLES; ACQUIRING FIRMS; ACQUISITIONS; MARKET; LIQUIDITY; BEHAVIOR; MERGERS;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhr109

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the pre-announcement target stock price run-up, and the post-announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion. We obtain identical results with higher market-level investor sentiment. When divergence of opinion is higher, a firm is less likely to be a takeover target, although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher. Our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion.

引用

页码：227 / 277

页数：51

共 37 条

[1]

[Anonymous], J FINANCIAL EC

[2] Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns [J].