Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply

被引：71

作者：

Back, K

Zender, JF

机构：

[1] Univ Arizona, Dept Finance, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

[2] Washington Univ, St Louis, MO USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 73卷 / 01期

关键词：

divisible good auctions; endogenous supply;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00465-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Uniform-price auctions are studied in which the seller may cancel part of the supply after observing the bids. This feature eliminates many of the `collusive seeming' equilibria of the auction. In equilibrium the seller always sells the full quantity. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：29 / 34

页数：6

共 13 条

[1]

AUSUBEL LM, 1999, DEMAND REDUCTION INE

[2] AUCTIONS OF DIVISIBLE GOODS - ON THE RATIONALE FOR THE TREASURY EXPERIMENT [J].